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1. INTRODUCTION
Anne-Maren Andersen starts her contribution developing the term pistis into an
analytical tool that she summarizes in table 1. She then applies the tool on Danish
parliamentary debate. Forced to make a choice I limit myself to some sketchy
remarks about the first part, the way Andersen develops the term pistis. In my
opinion it is useful to elaborate on the history of this term pistis to decide whether
we should adopt this term to denote the analytical tool presented in table 1. My
conclusion will be not to adopt it this way. However, that does not mean that the
analytical tool pretended by Andersen is not useful to analyze parliamentary debate.
The theoretical foundation however can be found in existing theories about the
principle of charity and cooperation principle.
2. SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE TERM PISTIS
The meaning of pistis in classical Greek rhetoric makes that we do not want to situate
pistis next to ethos, as Andersen proposes.
A crucial excerpt to trace the dominant meaning of pistis in Greek rhetoric is
454d in Plato’s Gorgias. Here Socrates opposes pistis with episteme, forcing Gorgias
to acknowledge the difference between these two concepts. There is no true and
false knowledge (episteme) but there is true and false belief (pistis). Continuing on
this intuitive distinction, Socrates and Gorgias agree that rhetoric as practiced in
courtrooms concerns pistis, not episteme.
Important references are of course to Aristotle who continuous on this
fundamental distinction, making clear that practical wisdom, phronesis, is not the
same as episteme (Rhetoric 1354a-1357a). In 1354a3 we encounter the term pisteis
as proof, describing enthymemes as the body of proof. Corbet and Connors (1999)
mention pisteis in relation to Aristotle as his term for rhetorical proofs, a term having
its roots in pistis = belief. So pistis refers to proof that is ultimately based on belief,
something the audience has to share with or accept from the orator. In this sense
pistis is used as the term that covers the different kinds of persuasive appeals: ethos,
pathos and logos. It should therefore not be conceptualized as something
complementary to ethos.
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It seems clear that in this specific Platonian–Aristotelian rhetorical realm
pistis as proof is opposed to the logical demonstration. It brings about belief,
conviction, that can be true or false. There is a relation with the concept of trust
which is Andersen’s dominant focus. But in these rhetorical contexts this relation is
a rather technical one. Trust may be used for a lack of skepticism that results from
shared beliefs.
Pistis in the meaning of trust predominantly does not come from the classical
rhetorical tradition. It comes from the biblical tradition that seems to take up a
meaning of pistis as warranty.
In Greek mythology there is the spirit (daimona) named Pistis, mentioned
among others by Theognis of Megara and Ovidius. Pistis seems to be the goddess of
Faith, or trust. Pistis denotes the specific form of trust that we find in Abraham when
he trusts the instructions of his God and is prepared to act upon these instructions.
This is the standard translation of pistis in the New Testament. According to
biblesuite.com there are 243 occurrences of pistis and conjugated forms in the New
Testament, all referring to faith as convictions that result from a divine warranty.
This source also tells that in antiquity the term pistis outside the specific rhetorical
texts referred to a guarantee (warranty). I have not been able to verify this. It could
explain the use of pistis for the means that may produce a conviction (proof) in predemocratic societies dominated by authority.
We should distinguish this biblical concept of trust in God from the more
general concept of trust in the sense of sharing beliefs which is the general principle
underlying phronesis. In this respect we should be careful with the references to
Fafner quoted by Andersen because specifically in Danish philosophical and
theological realms the biblical reception may be merged with contemporary
philosophical ideas, due to the fact that the term pistis plays an important role in the
philosophy of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard formulates a complex, maybe
predominantly contemporary relation between the biblical development and the
classical rhetorical development. According to Furtak (2013) Kierkegaard relates
his fundamental concept of skeptical doubt to the Socratic concept of pistis to
explore how humans in uncertainty maintain strong convictions.
Andersen observes that pistis as a term “[…] holds a duality, in that it encompasses
both the effect and the reason (cause): both the state of having faith or trusting, and
the very things that create said trust”. This observation is right, but it does not explain
the dual translation that Andersen proposes as trust and argumentum.
The situation seems more complicated than that. We seem to have religious
Faith and the divine warranty that may create such Faith. Then we have trust and
the very things that create trust. And we have conviction in the realm of phronesis
and the very means that create conviction. These last means we may call
argumentum, but we better use the term proof.

2

PAUL VAN DEN HOVEN
3. PISTIS AS A PRINCIPLE OF CHARITY OR A COOPERATION PRINCIPLE?
When we come closer to table 1 and when we look at its application on
parliamentary debate, the concept that underlies Andersen’s interpretation of pistis
seems to develop into Quine’s principle of charity or into a kind of cooperation
principle, similar to the suggestion that underlies her opening quote of 18th century
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Reid formulates the “the principle of veracity”
and “the principle of credulity”. Anderson’s quote of K.E. Løgstrup even more clearly
concerns a general conversational principle.
The interpretation of pistis as a cooperation principle is one that I cannot
trace back to antiquity. In contemporary scholarship however this presupposition
underlying all forms of communication has been explored in pragma linguistics in
general and in argument theory more specifically. Such explorations usually depart
from Grice’s conversational maxims.
As we know the work of Reid was familiar to Paul Grice, be it first of all on
the philosophical issue of personal identity. His cooperation principle may very well
be inspired on Reid’s work. I have not been able to find out whether Reid refers
explicitly to pistis. If so we would indeed have a historical connection between pistis
and the cooperation principle..
But still, the concept of presupposed cooperation underlying even
adversarial forms of communication is very different from Aristotle’s concept of
rhetorical proof. More important is that this cooperation principle has been
elaborated yet using different terms. Habermas has founded an elaborated system
on the insight that all forms of strategic acting presuppose a basic consensus and
cooperation. In pragma-dialectical argument theory the insight has been developed
in the notion of second and third order rules.
4. CONCLUSION
It seems that the interpretation of pistis as developed by Andersen is not as clearly
and straightforward as her essay may suggest. Developing the term as a cooperation
principle seems somewhat confusing. Such a development should better relate to
specific proposals made in pragmatics.
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